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I. BACKGROUND
With the rise of decolonization after the Second World War,
many developed countries entered into international investment
agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), in
order to protect themselves from uncompensated nationalization
and expropriation of property from newly independent countries,
due to colonialism’s long history and debilitating political, social,
and economic effects on their population.1  Simultaneously, newly
independent developing nations sought foreign direct investment
to stimulate their respective economies.2  These BITs, though still
providing for espousal of claims and diplomatic protection, created
standing for an investor to directly bring a claim against a state
* Jordan Behlman, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2014, University of Miami
School of Law; B.A., 2003, Vassar College.  This comment would not have been
possible without the support and guidance of Daniel Vielleville, Andrew Riccio, and
Paula Arias.
1. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agree-
ments, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168 (2005); see also Rudolf Dolzer &
Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 1 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2008); T.W. Walde, International Investment Law: An Overview of Key Concepts
and Methodology, 4:4 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (TDM) 3 (July 2007).
2. Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 171.
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by creating a private right of action.3  Investment treaties also
helped reconcile the risks assumed by developed countries with
the fairness and transparency expected by developing countries.4
While there was initially some hesitation by newly indepen-
dent nations due to fears of neocolonialism,5 the advent of the debt
crisis in the 1980s made developing countries fixate on creating
favorable investment conditions for developed countries.6  While
developing countries attracted investment, developed countries
expected security for those investments.  Consequently, the num-
ber of international investment agreements dramatically
increased in the 1980s and 1990s.7  Between 1959 and 1989, there
were fewer than 400 BITs, but over the next fifteen years, there
were approximately 2,000.8  With an astounding number of
BITs—not to mention the growth of multilateral investment trea-
ties, and bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements—host
countries became concerned with the growth of “treaty shopping”
in the international community.  Developing countries, therefore,
needed to determine whether foreign investors had a sufficient
connection to the treaty under which they sought protection and
redress.9  This became increasingly important as nationality
became more fluid and as the world became, and continues to
become, more globalized.
Although the international community experienced a large
increase in the number of international investment agreements in
the 1980s and 1990s, discussion of the denial of benefits clause
(“DOB clause”) can be traced back to the 1950s.10  In 1956, Her-
man Walker Jr. noted, “The recent treaties signed by the United
States, at any rate, indicate that this possibility of a ‘free ride’ by
third-country interests is one to be guarded against . . .”11 This
3. Id. at 175.
4. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS, 2
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
5. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 Int’l L. 655,
659–60 (1990).  Developing countries began to demand a New International Economic
Order that rejected that customary international law required host countries to
uphold a minimum standard of protection to foreign investors.
6. Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 178.
7. Id. at 178–79.
8. Id. at 179.
9. Loukas A. Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article 17
of the Energy Charter Treaty, 113:4 PENN ST. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2009).
10. Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United State Commercial
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 388 (1956).
11. Id.
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concept of a “free ride” by third party nationals is exactly what the
DOB clause seeks to prevent.12  While this idea was raised in
1950s scholarship, it is more relevant today than ever.
Treaties include a DOB clause to prevent third parties from
“treaty shopping”: the practice of multinational companies being
structured to take advantage of favorable tax or dispute resolution
benefits without actually assuming any obligations under a partic-
ular treaty.13  The DOB clause, therefore, maintains reciprocity of
benefits while excluding “shell companies” from receiving treaty
protection.14  Dolzer and Schruer suggest that while “treaty shop-
ping” itself may not be “illegal or unethical,” states “may regard
such practices as undesirable and take appropriate measures
against them.“15
With increasing globalization, many states entered into mul-
tilateral investment treaties and BITs opted to include a DOB
clause.  For example, the 2012 Model U.S. BIT contains a DOB
clause in Article 17.16  Likewise, the Energy Charter Treaty
(“ECT”) contains a clause entitled “Non-Application of Part III in
Certain Circumstances.”17  These DOB clauses, while similar in
many ways, have important differences in context, wording, and
effect.
Without a DOB clause, investors can access treaty benefits
directly through the treaty or by importing more favorable provi-
sions through the treaty’s Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”) clause.
According to the International Law Commission, an MFN clause
is “a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes an obligation
towards another State to accord most-favored-nation treatment in
an agreed sphere of relations.”18  Essentially, the MFN clause pre-
vents third-party states from receiving more preferential treat-
ment than the contracting states.  If other treaties contain
provisions that are more favorable, parties are able to import
those more favorable rights into the treaty.19
Thus, a DOB clause, in a way, seeks to limit the effect of the
12. Id.
13. Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 9, at 1302.
14. Id.
15. Dolzer, supra note 1 at 55.
16. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 17, available at http://www.
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
17. Energy Charter Treaty, art. 17, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 (1995)
[hereinafter ECT].
18. ‘Final Draft Articles on Most Favored Nation Clauses’ YB of Int’l L.
Commission (Vol. 2, Pt. 2, 30th session, 1978) 16 (Art. 4).
19. Many Investor-State arbitral tribunals conflict over whether MFN clauses
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MFN clause. It does so by denying certain treaty benefits to third
parties that could be obtained by the presence of a MFN clause,
but without the presence of a DOB provision.  A DOB clause pre-
vents third parties from raising claims under a treaty.  Further-
more, a DOB clause also prevents contracting parties of one treaty
from importing specific benefits from a comparator treaty.  Nor-
mally, a third party would not have the right to gain any treaty
protection.
Similar to other treaties, such as the ECT, the Dominican
Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”)
includes a DOB clause.  CAFTA parties have good reason to pre-
vent treaty shopping and secure CAFTA’s benefits and obliga-
tions.  Following the implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), many Central American countries
sought to mirror the boost in foreign direct investment exper-
ienced by Mexico.20  NAFTA, a trade and investment agreement
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, which was ratified
in 1994, “aims at the free movement and liberalization of goods,
services, people, and investments.”21
Mexico experienced increased foreign direct investment that
inspired Central American countries.22  For example, foreign
direct investment to Mexico prior to NAFTA from 1991 to 1993
totaled $12 billion.  Fewer than ten years later, however, foreign
direct investment to Mexico totaled $54 billion.23  From the stand-
point of Central American countries, the expected benefits of
CAFTA included “enhanced access to their largest export market,
increased foreign direct investment, and institutional strengthen-
ing across a range of trade – and investment related areas.”24
With only six countries party to CAFTA, it was essential to protect
investment to encourage foreign direct investment from the domi-
nant developed contracting state at the time: the United States.25
CAFTA, like many other multilateral treaties, contains a
DOB clause to protect the contracting parties’ rights from “free-
only apply to substantive rights (merits) or to procedural rights (dispute resolution)
as well.
20. M. Ayhan Kose, Alessandro Rebucci, & Alfred Schipke, Macroeconomic
Implications of CAFTA-DR, in CENTRAL AMERICA: GLOBAL INTEGRATION AND
REGIONAL COOPERATION 17 (Markus Rodlauer & Alfred Scipke eds., 2005).
21. Dolzer, supra note 1 at 28.
22. Kose, supra note 20, at 17.
23. Id.
24. Dolzer, supra note 1, at 7.
25. See generally Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement,
Jan. 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA].
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riding” third parties.26   The tribunal in Pacific Rim Cayman LLC
v. The Republic of El Salvador (“Pacific Rim”)27 analyzed the DOB
clause solely by using the treaty interpretation principles of Arti-
cle 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).28
While both parties urged the tribunal to reference past tribunals’
treatment of the DOB clause under other treaties, such as the
ECT, the tribunal refused because of CAFTA’s “different wording,
context, and effect.”29 Pacific Rim is the first tribunal to analyze
CAFTA’s DOB clause.30  It is the first, and only, instance where a
tribunal has denied benefits to a claimant under CAFTA or
NAFTA.31
Pacific Rim will be a highly influential case in DOB clause
jurisprudence because the DOB interpretation in this case will
likely have a significant impact on future tribunals’ understand-
ing and interpretation of the CAFTA DOB clause.  This is particu-
larly true with regard to the United States.  While tribunal
decisions are not binding on other tribunals, future tribunals will
turn to Pacific Rim when the DOB clause is invoked under
CAFTA.
This comment’s purpose is twofold.  First, it will show how,
26. See generally id.
27. Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 4.3 (June 1,
2012) [hereinafter Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision].
28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
Article 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together
with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application
of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
29. Pac Rim Jurisdictional Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.3.
30. Id. ¶ 4.45.
31. Id. ¶ 4.3.
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unlike previous tribunals’ interpretations of the ECT’s DOB
clause, Pacific Rim correctly applied VCLT treaty interpretation
principles by examining both the ordinary meaning of the text and
the treaty’s context.  Second, this comment will show that the
DOB clause, under the Pacific Rim analysis, is a proper and effec-
tive solution to unwanted and improper “treaty shopping” by for-
eign investors.  Part II will analyze Pacific Rim’s treatment of the
CAFTA DOB clause.  It examines the facts of the case in relation
to the DOB clause, and the manner in which the tribunal analyzed
those facts retrospectively to define what constitutes “substantial
business activities” and “own or control” under CAFTA. Plama
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (“Plama”), unlike
Pacific Rim, created the precedent that the ECT DOB clause could
only be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.   Fur-
thermore, Plama relegates the DOB clause analysis to the merits
phase. Pacific Rim, however, takes a retroactive approach,
allowing it to be a jurisdictional decision, which, I argue, is the
more faithful application of the VCLT.32
In Part III, this comment compares the language and struc-
ture of the CAFTA and ECT DOB clauses. It illustrates how and
why the CAFTA interpretation is more faithful to the treaty inter-
pretation principles outlined in Article 31 of the VCLT.33  This
analysis will address the differences between the ECT and
CAFTA DOB clause interpretation, such as jurisdictional limita-
tions and the retrospective versus prospective effect, and will
examine how these differences impact common language in the
ECT and CAFTA, such as “substantial business activities,” and
the meaning of “own or control.”  Part IV discusses how Pacific
Rim, unlike the recent ECT tribunals’ analyses of the DOB clause,
and the use of the MFN clause, provides a proper and effective
solution to “treaty shopping.”  Last, Part V provides concluding
thoughts on how Pacific Rim provides guidance to future tribunals
that will wrestle with DOB clause application and interpretation
under CAFTA and beyond.
II. PACIFIC RIM’S TREATMENT OF THE DR-CAFTA DENIAL
OF BENEFITS CLAUSE
As mentioned above, the Pacific Rim tribunal decided not to
reference past tribunals’ decisions under other treaties, such as
32. See Generally Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (February 8, 2005) [hereinafter Plama].
33. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31.
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the ECT, due to “their different wording, context and effect.”34  In
other words, the tribunal relied solely on VCLT treaty interpreta-
tion principles to apply CAFTA to the facts of the case.  To under-
stand the tribunal’s interpretative process, one must first identify
the facts relevant to the DOB clause analysis.
The claimant, Pacific Rim Cayman LLC (“Pac Rim”), a
Nevada corporation, is wholly owned by Pacific Rim Mining Cor-
poration (“PRMC”), a gold exploration company incorporated
under Canadian law.35  Pac Rim raised claims on behalf of two of
its subsidiaries, Sociedad Ano´nima de Capital Variable and
Dorado Exploraciones Sociedad Ano´nima de Capital Variable,
both Salvadoran corporations,36 against the Republic of El Salva-
dor (“El Salvador”) for failing to grant exploitation permits in
accordance with El Salvador’s laws.37  The crux of the DOB claim,
however, was Pac Rim’s corporate reorganization from the Cay-
man Islands to Nevada, United States.38  Conveniently, the United
States and El Salvador are contracting parties to CAFTA,
whereas the Cayman Islands and Canada are not.39
El Salvador argued that it could deny CAFTA protection to
Pac Rim because it did not have “substantial business activities”
in the United States, nor was it “owned or controlled” by United
States nationals.40 As evident from the treaty provision itself, Pac
Rim had to prove one of these two elements to be eligible for
CAFTA protection:
Subject to Articles 18.3 (Notification and Provision of Infor-
mation) and 20.4 (Consultations), a Party may deny the
benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that
is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of
that investor if the enterprise has no substantial business
activities in the territory of any Party, other than the deny-
ing Party, and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying
Party, own or control the enterprise.41
34. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.3.
35. Id. ¶ 1.1.
36. Id. ¶ 1.2.
37. Krista Sceffey, Pacific Rim v. El Salvador and the Perils of Free Trade in the
Americas, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (July 30, 2010), http://www.coha.org/
pacific-rim-v-el-salvador-and-the-perils-of-free-trade-in-the-americas/.
38. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 1.3.
39. See generally CAFTA, supra note 25.
40. Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/12, The Republic of El Salvador’s Memorial Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 110
(October 15, 2010) 41–42 [hereinafter Pac Rim El Salvador MOJ].
41. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 10.12(2).
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Thus, the first issue addressed by the tribunal was whether Pac
Rim had “substantial business activities.”42
CAFTA, like many international investment agreements,
does not define “substantial” in the treaty’s text.43  For example,
NAFTA Article 1113(2) states, in part, that “a Party may deny the
benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an
enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investors if
investors of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the
enterprise has no substantial business activities . . . .” (emphasis
added).44  The ECT is another example of a major multilateral
investment treaty that uses the “substantial business activities”
language without providing a clear definition.45  Faced with no
definition of “substantial,” and guided by a faithful application of
VCLT Article 31, the tribunal examined the facts in addition to
Pac Rim’s own testimony in order to determine whether its busi-
ness activities rose to the level of “substantial.”46
El Salvador relied heavily on Pac Rim’s affirmation that it
was a holding company with no other purpose but to hold shares
for its Canadian parent company.47  Pac Rim had no office space,
no employees, no board of directors, no United States bank
account, and it conducted no exploration activities.48  Moreover,
Pac Rim did not pay any taxes in the United States.49  El Salvador
argued that Pac Rim did not rise to the level of a holding company,
because it was simply a “shell company.”50  To quote El Salvador,
“A holding company, owned entirely by the parent company, with
no operations, incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction unrelated
to the business, is the quintessential example of a shell company.”
(emphasis included).51
El Salvador, in great detail, depicted Pac Rim as a shell com-
pany.  On Pac Rim’s Nevada Business Registration form, it listed
PRMC’s address and did not check a single box for business activ-
ity.52  On its supplemental tax forms, Pac Rim checked boxes for
42. Pac Rim Jurisdictional Decision, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.63–4.78.
43. See generally CAFTA, supra note 25.
44. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993), art. 1113(2).
45. ECT, supra note 17, art. 17.




50. Pac Rim El Salvador MOJ, supra note 40, ¶ 116.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 130.
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“[c]orporation with no employees,”53 and its lease information for
the Nevada office provided PRMC’s Canadian address, and the
office itself had the name “Pacific Rim Mining Corp.” posted above
the door.54  The two managers of Pac Rim were officers of PRMC,
and all bank transfers by these officers went through PRMC
itself.55  El Salvador provided rich details to illustrate to the tribu-
nal that no shred of evidence could define Pac Rim’s activities in
the United States as “substantial.”
Pac Rim did not dispute any evidence, but instead adhered
largely to the facts of the case by arguing that because Nevada
was its principle place of business, and, therefore, the “nerve
center” of its operations, Pac Rim had “substantial business activi-
ties” in the United States.56  Moreover, it urged the tribunal to
account for the “. . .activities of the corporate family as a whole.”57
Thus, whether “in isolation or as part of the broader corporate
group,” the tribunal should classify Pac Rim’s United States busi-
ness activities as “substantial.”58  Pac Rim wanted the tribunal to
look beyond the activities of the claimant to the corporate group
that was not a party to the arbitration.
Pac Rim asserted that Article 10.12.2 must be interpreted
prospectively rather than retrospectively.  It argued that the use
of the present tense in the phrase “has substantial business activi-
ties” meant that El Salvador could not deny CAFTA benefits “sim-
ply because the investment preceded the establishment of
substantial business activities.”59  The activities must be analyzed
from the moment El Salvador sought to deny benefits.60  Pac Rim
believed that this was the only interpretation that would promote
the object and purpose of CAFTA to “substantially increase invest-
ment opportunities.”61
The tribunal used the ordinary meaning and context of
CAFTA Article 10.12.2, and the object and purpose of the DOB
clause and CAFTA to analyze the parties’ arguments.62  Unlike
53. Id. ¶¶ 128, 140.
54. Id. ¶ 140.
55. Id. ¶¶¶ 144, 170–71.
56. Pacific Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/12, Rejoinder on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 150–53 (Mar. 2,
2011) [hereinafter Pac Rim Rejoinder].
57. Id. ¶ 147.
58. Id. ¶ 163.
59. Id. ¶ 160.
60. Id. ¶ 158.
61. Id.
62. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.61.
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the analyses of other tribunals, which will be discussed below in
later sections, Pacific Rim faithfully applied the VCLT Article 31
interpretative principles.  CAFTA Article 2.1 defines an “enter-
prise” as “any entity constituted or organized under applicable
law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately-owned or
governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partner-
ship, sole proprietorship, joint venture, or other association.”63
Thus, Pac Rim, not PRMC, was the enterprise in this case because
it was the claimant.  Based on the treaty’s definition of “enter-
prise,” and the context of the DOB clause itself, Pac Rim’s activi-
ties—not those of PRMC—must rise to “substantial.”64  In the
words of the tribunal, “[i]f that enterprise’s own activities do not
reach the level stipulated by CAFTA Article 10.12.2, it cannot
aggregate to itself the separate activities of other natural or legal
persons to increase the level of its own activities for the purpose of
applying CAFTA Article 10.12.2.”65  This interpretation was con-
ducive to both the ordinary meaning of the text and the context of
the treaty as a whole.
Not only could Pac Rim not aggregate the activities of other
enterprises, but the tribunal also refused to take a prospective
approach to the ordinary meaning of Article 10.12.2.  The question
was not whether there would be “substantial business activities”
arising from an investment, but whether “the claimant by itself
had substantial business activities in the USA from 13 December
2007 onwards.”66  In other words, did Pac Rim have “substantial
business activities” starting from the date of the corporate reor-
ganization from the Cayman Islands to Nevada?  While Article
10.12.2 is written in the present tense, the tribunal chose to
examine the DOB clause in the context of the treaty.  How could a
DOB clause be effective if past activities are not indicative of the
status of the enterprise?
As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of a DOB clause
is to prevent third parties from obtaining treaty benefits without
assuming any treaty obligations.67  To this end, it is essential that
tribunals look retrospectively. As James Chalker suggests, a ret-
rospective effect on a DOB clause encourages “investors to be
upfront about ownership, control, nationality, and citizenship.”68
63. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 2.1.
64. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.66.
65. Id.
66. Id. ¶ 4.67.
67. Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 9, at 1302.
68. James Chalker, Making the Energy Charter Treaty Too Investor Friendly:
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Chalker’s argument can also be extended to “substantial business
activities.”  To give proper effect to the CAFTA DOB clause, a con-
tracting party must be able to examine whether “substantial busi-
ness activities” existed at the time of the dispute and at the
moment when the claimant requests arbitration.  A prospective
application, conversely, would eviscerate the DOB clause. It would
give no effect to activities of an entity when a dispute arises, and it
would provide no vantage point to evaluate whether an enterprise
does in fact have “substantial business activities.”
Given all the facts provided by El Salvador, and admitted by
Pac Rim’s testimony, the tribunal found that Pac Rim was merely
a “passive actor.”69  Pac Rim’s activities were associated with
PRMC, not Pac Rim.70 Moreover, these activities were directed at
El Salvador, not the United States.71  The tribunal concluded that
“[Pac Rim] was and is not a traditional holding company actively
holding shares in subsidiaries but more akin to a shell company
with no geographical location for its nominal, passive, limited and
insubstantial activities.”72
The tribunal next turned to the second condition of the
CAFTA DOB clause, which is whether Pac Rim was “owned or
controlled” by persons of the United States.73  While the wording
of 10.12.2 requires that Pac Rim be owned or controlled by
another CAFTA contracting party, El Salvador argued that Pac
Rim satisfies neither condition.74 Rather than being “owned or
controlled” by United States nationals, El Salvador alleged that
Pac Rim was owned and controlled by PRMC, a Canadian corpora-
tion.75  Not only was PRMC “the sole member” of Pac Rim, but it
was also its sole owner.76  PRMC, as sole owner, appointed all of
the Pac Rim’s managers.77  It was not United States shareholders,
or Mr. Thomas C. Shrake (“Mr. Shrake”), President and CEO of
PRMC, who owned or controlled Pac Rim, but rather PRMC, the
Canadian parent company.
Pac Rim took an alternative approach to prove ownership and
Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, 3:5 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE
MGMT 1, 17 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter Chalker].
69. Pac Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.68.
70. Id. ¶ 4.76.
71. Id. ¶ 4.74.
72. Id. ¶ 4.75.
73. Id. ¶ 4.11–4.16.
74. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 10.12.2.
75. Pac Rim El Salvador MOJ, supra note 40, ¶ 110.
76. Id. ¶ 113.
77. Id.
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control by United States nationals.  It argued, “[t]he ultimate
owners and controllers of [Pac Rim] are the U.S. persons who own
a majority of the shares of the parent company.”78  Furthermore,
Mr. Shrake, a United States citizen and Nevada resident, “makes
and implements key decisions for [Pac Rim] in his capacity as
Manager, thereby steering [Pac Rim’s] fortunes and exercising
control over the [Pac Rim].”79  While this might not constitute
direct ownership or control, it asserted that CAFTA’s definition of
investment signifies that the ownership or control can be either
direct or indirect.80
Given the facts, the tribunal again faithfully applied VCLT
Article 31 by looking to the ordinary meaning of “ownership or
control” in the context of the DOB clause and CAFTA in general.
Regardless of whether a majority of Pac Rim’s shareholders reside
in or have postal addresses in the United States, Pac Rim is still
“owned and controlled” by its Canadian parent company, PRMC.81
The tribunal dismissed the claimant’s argument that “agencies
apply a rule of thumb whereby majority beneficial ownership by
persons with addresses in the United States is considered to be
majority beneficial ownership by U.S. citizens.”82  Instead of using
a “rule of thumb,”83 the tribunal refers to the United States Immi-
gration and Nationality Act for the definition of a United States
national and found, “[p]ermanent allegiance to the USA cannot be
met by adducing mere US postal addresses for shareholders in the
Canadian parent company, even assuming them to be natural per-
sons and however convenient or even appropriate for other domes-
tic purposes. . . .”84
Even if the shareholders were legitimate United States
nationals, PMRC, its parent company, owns and controls Pac Rim.
The tribunal correctly determined that Pac Rim was, and is, a
Canadian citizen.  Because PRMC is not the claimant, there was
no reason to look at the complex corporate structure of PRMC.
The fact remained that PRMC wholly owned Pac Rim.  The lan-
guage and the context of the CAFTA DOB clause focus on the
“enterprise.” This emphasis makes perfect sense in light of both
the ordinary meaning of the language as well as the definition’s
78. Pac Rim Rejoinder, supra note 56, ¶ 164.
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶ 169.
81. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.79-4.80.
82. Id. ¶¶ 4.16, 4.81.
83. Id. ¶ 4.16.
84. Id.
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context in the CAFTA DOB clause.  It is Pac Rim that requested
arbitration, and, consequently, it must be Pac Rim, and not a
third party, that must be evaluated under the treaty’s terms and
language.
Finally, the tribunal addressed the issue of timeliness.
Unlike other DOB clauses, CAFTA Article 10.12.2 is subject to
Article 18.3 and 20.4.  Article 18.3 requires that one party must
notify the other party “to the maximum extent possible” of any
measure that “might materially affect the operation of this Agree-
ment.”85  Article 20.4 allows any party to request consultation in
writing relating to any measure that “might affect the operation of
the Agreement.”86  El Salvador argued that it complied with both
CAFTA provisions.  Nowhere in Article 10.12.2 does the provision
require a time constraint on the invocation of the DOB clause, or
state that it must be invoked prior to the arbitration’s commence-
ment.87  Rather, El Salvador provided timely notification because
it was not notified that the claimant changed nationality in 2007
until June 16, 2008, due to an “unrelated query by the El Salva-
dor’s National Investment Office.”88  El Salvador was unable to
complete its investigation into Pac Rim’s nationality until it
invoked the DOB clause on August 3, 2010.89  With regard to Arti-
cle 20.4, the tribunal found that the United States government
never requested consultations, and only the United States govern-
ment, not Pac Rim, would have had standing to make such a
request.90
Pac Rim, however, argued that El Salvador did not comply
with Article 18.3 and 20.4, and should be prevented from invoking
the DOB clause.91  Pac Rim claimed that El Salvador could have
notified the United States “as early as June 2008,”92 and that El
Salvador should have notified Pac Rim of its intent to deny bene-
fits prior to arbitration.93  Pac Rim likens Article 20.4’s consulta-
tion provision to a breach of diplomatic protection provided in the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”) Article 27.94  Pac
85. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 18.3.
86. Id. art. 20.4.
87. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.20.
88. Id. ¶ 4.22.
89. Id. ¶ 4.25.
90. Id. ¶ 4.27.
91. Id. ¶ 4.40.
92. Id. ¶ 4.39.
93. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.40.
94. Pac Rim Rejoinder, supra note 56, ¶ 203.
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Rim argues that “[a] State may be considered to be giving diplo-
matic protection to its investor through measures that fall short of
espousal.”95  Pac Rim contends that El Salvador’s understanding
of ICSID Convention Article 27 is too limited.96
While requiring notification and an opportunity for consulta-
tion by subjecting the clause to Article 18.3 and 20.4, the DOB
clause does in fact specify when a state can deny benefits to an
investor.97  Because there is no specific time limit contained in
Article 10.12.2,98 and because Pac Rim elected ICSID arbitration,
the Pacific Rim tribunal consulted ICSID Convention Article 41.99
Article 41 states that any objection by a respondent that the dis-
pute is not within its jurisdiction, or, for other reasons, is not
within the competence of the tribunal, “shall be made as early as
possible” and “no later than the expiration of the time limit fixed
for the filing of the counter-memorial.”100
The Pacific Rim tribunal incorporated Article 41 into the
CAFTA DOB clause.  It agreed that El Salvador had timely
invoked the DOB clause.  In its opinion, “[i]t is not appar-
ent. . .that [El Salvador] thereby deliberately sought or indeed
gained any advantage over the claimant, by waiting until 1 March
2010 (as regards notification to the USA) or 3 August 2010 (for its
invocation of the DOB clause to [Pac Rim]).”101 Because no advan-
tage was sought or gained, El Salvador properly and timely
invoked the CAFTA DOB clause.
The Pacific Rim tribunal further agreed with El Salvador that
CAFTA Articles 18.3 and 20.4 were not to be understood as diplo-
matic protection within the meaning of ICSID Convention Article
27.  These provisions were not drafted to enable states to secure
redress for international wrongful acts.102  Instead, the provisions
were informal diplomatic exchanges to facilitate settlement
between the parties.  In other words, the Pacific Rim tribunal
envisioned Article 20.4 as a procedure that fell short of full diplo-
matic protection. These interpretative strategies were not
addressed in the DOB clause.  Rather, it looked to the context of
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 10.12.2.
98. Id.
99. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.81.
100. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 41, Mar. 18. 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
101. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.84.
102. Id. ¶ 4.88.
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the treaty and the ICSID Convention to find an applicable stan-
dard that preserved the object and purpose of the treaty as well as
the DOB clause.
The Pacific Rim tribunal’s analysis takes a holistic approach
to VCLT Article 31.  Instead of focusing only on the ordinary
meaning of the text, the tribunal accounts for the treaty’s object
and purpose, as well as its context, in its analysis. This approach
effectuates the DOB clause’s purpose and meaning.  If a tribunal
is to evaluate whether an enterprise has “substantial business
activity” in a contracting state, or whether it is “owned or con-
trolled” by nationals of a contracting state, it must examine these
terms in relation to both the investor and the investment.  If a
party is to provide notification that it is invoking such a clause, it
must be able to distinguish whether the claimant is eligible for
treaty protection.  In a globalized world where nationality has
become fluid and where corporate reorganization is frequent, it is
nonsensical to expect governments to track the corporate govern-
ance of all private investors engaged in long-term investments.
Moreover, a state cannot predict which entity could potentially
raise a claim.  Identifying the claimant is crucial to assessing the
benefits and obligations afforded to the investor and the invest-
ment.  It is not possible for a host state to reasonably assess
whether the claimant can claim treaty protection until after a dis-
pute has led the parties to state their intentions to arbitrate.
III. COMPARING THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE
CAFTA DOB CLAUSE
Although Pacific Rim was the first case to invoke the CAFTA
DOB clause, many other tribunals have wrestled with DOB
clauses from other treaties.  Despite differences in context and
wording, there are also many similarities between the CAFTA
DOB clause and the DOB clauses in other treaties.  To illustrate
Pacific Rim’s distinct application of VCLT Article 31, it is useful to
examine how other tribunals have interpreted the DOB clause in
another treaty, such as the ECT.  Because a tribunal has yet to
struggle with NAFTA’s DOB clause, the ECT provides a strong
comparator treaty because, like CAFTA, it is a multilateral
agreement.
Despite different contexts, the object and purpose of both
CAFTA and the ECT is to promote foreign investment.  The
CAFTA preamble states that one of its primary purposes is to
“contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of
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world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international coop-
eration.”103  Similarly, ECT Article 2 states that the treaty pro-
vides “a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-
operation in the energy field, based on complementarities and
mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles
of the Charter.”104  While CAFTA is focused on fostering coopera-
tion among its contracting parties in world trade and foreign
direct investment, the ECT is focused on strengthening invest-
ment and cooperation among its contracting parties in the energy
sector.
While the object and purpose of CAFTA and ECT are rela-
tively similar in that each treaty encourages cooperation in for-
eign investment, tribunals have interpreted the respective DOB
clauses differently.  Both treaties use the phrases “substantial
business activities” and “own or control” as conditions precedent
for granting or denying treaty benefits.  While the Pacific Rim tri-
bunal examined both the ordinary meaning and the context of the
applicable treaty in its decision, the Plama tribunal only analyzed
the ordinary meaning of the treaty provision, leaving the DOB
clause with an absurd meaning as a merits-based question rather
than as a jurisdictional safeguard.  Consequently, the DOB clause
was robbed of any substantive meaning.
A. Jurisdictional Limitation
Unlike in Pacific Rim, tribunals have interpreted the DOB
clause from the ECT as providing no jurisdictional limitation.105
In other words, a denial of benefits can only relate to a dispute’s
merits.  This conclusion is based on the provision’s ordinary mean-
ing rather than the context of the treaty.  ECT Article 17(1)’s
heading and wording are drafted as follows:
ARTICLE 17 NON-APPLICATION OF PART III IN
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the
advantages of this Part to: (1) a legal entity if citizens or
nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if
that entity has no substantial business activities in the
Area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized.106
103. CAFTA, supra note 25, Preamble.
104. ECT, supra note 17, art. 2.
105. Laurence Shore, The Jurisdictional Problem in Energy Charter Treaty Claims,
10 INT’L ARBITRATION L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Shore].
106. ECT, supra note 17, art. 17.
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Because the ECT’s dispute resolution provision, Article 26, is
located in Part V rather than Part III, tribunals have restricted
Article 17’s application to the substantive rights in the merits
phase rather than procedural rights during the jurisdictional
phase.
The Plama tribunal established a restrictive interpretation of
ECT Article 17.107  The tribunal only looked to the “ordinary mean-
ing” of the language without placing it in its proper context as
required by VCLT Article 31.108  In Plama, a Cypriot company
sued Bulgaria over the privatization of a state owned oil refinery.
The claimant alleged that Bulgaria failed to create a stable invest-
ment environment. Because the heading is worded “Non-Applica-
tion of Part III,” and because the provision states, “deny the
advantages of this Part. . .” the Plama tribunal decided that Arti-
cle 26, the dispute settlement provision in Part V, was not applica-
ble.  The Plama tribunal claimed that “the language is
unambiguous,”109 and, therefore, “[T]he express terms of Article 17
refer to a denial of the advantages ‘of this Part’, thereby referring
to the substantive advantages conferred upon an investor by Part
III of the ECT.”110
This restrictive analysis was affirmed in Ltd. Liab. Co. AMTO
v. Ukraine (“AMTO”) when the tribunal explained that the “claim-
ant has the burden to prove that it satisfies the definition of an
Investor so as to be entitled to Part III protections and the right to
arbitrate disputes in Article 26.”111  While that may have been the
“ordinary meaning” of the provision, the tribunal never considered
whether that particular interpretation was appropriate within the
general context of the treaty.
CAFTA, conversely, does not use limiting language in the con-
struction of its DOB clause.  CAFTA’s Article 10.12 states the
following:
Article 10.12: Denial of Benefits
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an
investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such other
Party and to investments of that investor if persons of a
107. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 147.
108. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31.
109. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 147.
110. Id.
111. Ltd. Liab. Co. AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Arbitration No. 080/2005, Final Award,
¶ 64 (Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter AMTO].
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non-Party own or control the enterprise and the denying
Party:
(a)  does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-
Party; or
(b)  adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-
Party or a person of the non- Party that prohibit transac-
tions with the enterprise or that would be violated or cir-
cumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to
the enterprise or to its investments.
2. Subject to Articles 18.3 (Notification and Provision of
Information) and 20.4 (Consultations), a Party may deny
the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party
that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments
of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial busi-
ness activities in the territory of any Party, other than the
denying Party, and persons of a non-Party, or of the deny-
ing Party, own or control the enterprise.
The language applies to both Chapter 10 Section A, “Invest-
ment,” and Chapter 10 Section B, “Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment.”112  It is also encouraging that both Section A and Section B
are located in Chapter 10, while the ECT separates the two provi-
sions into separate and distinct parts.  Based on a systematic
interpretation of CAFTA, this seems a suitable interpretation
because the Pacific Rim tribunal applied a good-faith interpreta-
tion based on the ordinary meaning and the context of the treaty.
Because both the ordinary meaning and the context of the lan-
guage were not “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” the Pacific
Rim tribunal did not have to go beyond the provision’s language.113
The language of the DOB clause, therefore, fits comfortably within
the construction of the treaty.
Under the Plama and AMTO interpretations, however, the
tribunals misapplied the VCLT by not looking beyond the ordi-
nary meaning when the textual interpretation denied the DOB
clause of any purpose and effect, and when the textual interpreta-
tion would be “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”114  The textual
interpretation would be unreasonable because under these inter-
pretations, the DOB clause would serve no purpose, and thus,
would not fit into the treaty’s context.  Consequently, the DOB
clauses’ language had a direct effect on the Plama and AMTO
tribunals’ interpretations of the treaty.  Because the ordinary
112. CAFTA, supra note 25, art. 10.
113. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32.
114. Id.
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meaning of the DOB clause was consistent with the treaty’s con-
text, Pacific Rim provided full effect to the DOB clause.  When the
ordinary meaning and the context were inconsistent, the DOB
clause lost its purpose and effect.  Just as bad facts can make bad
law, poor drafting can lead to poor interpretation.
Despite arguing that its interpretation was consistent with
the contextual meaning of the DOB clause,115 Plama’s analysis
never moved beyond the ordinary meaning of the language. By
solely focusing on the reference to Part III in the heading and text,
the Plama tribunal ignored over fifty years of jurisprudence that
has relied upon the principle that “standard practice has been to
consider ‘denial of benefits’ as an objection that a host State can
raise against diplomatic protection, and its successor, investment
arbitration, against companies controlled from outside the
treaty.”116 The Plama tribunal, therefore, should have examined
the supplementary means of interpretation, because as specified
in VCLT Article 32(b), Plama’s DOB clause interpretation “leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”117
According to Thomas W. Walde, nothing in the travaux indi-
cated a shift for denial of benefits practice, and thus “[t]he Part III
reference in an interpretation of the context (Articles 26(1) –
17(1)) should be seen as nothing but a reminder that the denial of
benefits, for example, raising a jurisdictional objection, only
applied to the arbitrable (justiciable) Part III investment obliga-
tions.”118  Laurence Shore supports Walde’s interpretation, and
suggests, “[i]t is a perfectly plausible reading. . .to find that as Art.
17(1) relates so centrally to the Art. 26(1) requirements of investor
status (“Investor of another Contracting Party”) and a breach of
Part III obligation, that it constitutes a jurisdictional considera-
115. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 147.
116. THOMAS W. WALDE, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and
Examples, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUR 727 (Christina Binder et. al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
Walde].
117. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32.
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation: Recourse may
be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable.
118. Walde, supra note 116, at 727.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\45-2\IAL201.txt unknown Seq: 20  8-MAY-14 12:28
416 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2
tion for an arbitral tribunal.”119
Furthermore, in reference to the Plama tribunal, Chalker
asserts that “[h]iding behind Article 31 (1) VCLT, the tribunal
never answered the basic question of how there can be Article 26
ECT jurisdiction, which it recognizes as limited to Part II, if a
respondent properly invokes Article 17 (1), which denies the inves-
tor any Part III protections.”120  Unlike the interpretation in
Plama, Pacific Rim gives jurisdictional effect to the DOB clause.
After all, how is a host state to know which investors will file a
claim, and which nationality the investor will have at the moment
a claim is filed?
It is possible that if CAFTA’s DOB clause had been drafted
similarly to the ECT’s DOB clause, the tribunal may also have
limited its analysis to the ordinary meaning. However, because
the ordinary meaning and context were consistent in Pacific Rim,
one will never know how the interpretation would have changed if
the provision were drafted differently.  What is important to note
is the effect that treaty language can have on a tribunal’s inter-
pretative approach.  The ordinary meaning may be important, but
it is only one element of VCLT Article 31.121  Article 31 is titled
“General rule of interpretation,” and, therefore, should be read
holistically as one single rule with various elements.122  The rule of
interpretation is that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose.”123  It would seem from the outcomes that the tribunals in
the ECT cases stopped reading VCLT Article 31 at “ordinary
meaning” and forgot that such meaning shall be interpreted in
light of the treaty’s context, object, and purpose.124
B. Retrospective or Prospective Effect
Whereas the Plama tribunal granted a prospective effect to
the DOB clause, the Pacific Rim tribunal applied the CAFTA DOB
clause retrospectively.  Only a retrospective effect provides a DOB
clause with any significance.  This retrospective versus prospec-
tive analysis is fundamental for interpreting when the DOB
119. Shore, supra note 105, at 6.
120. Chalker, supra note 68, at 7.
121. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32(1).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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clause is generally applied, and specifically in the evaluation of
“substantial business activities” and “ownership or control.”
In Plama, the tribunal interpreted the phrase “reserves the
right” as an existence of a right that must be exercised.125  Because
it is drafted in the present tense and the ECT is based on long-
term cooperation, the tribunal argued that an investor would not
be able to plan its investment if the DOB clause had a retrospec-
tive effect.126  This interpretation was reinforced in Yukos Univer-
sal Unlimited (Isle of Man) and The Russian Federation (“Yukos”)
when the tribunal decided that a “[r]etrospective application of a
denial of rights would be inconsistent with such promotion and
protection and constitute treatment at odds with those terms.”127
Consequently, Plama and Yukos are both pro-investor inter-
pretations because the tribunals value the investor’s rights over
those of the host state.  Scholars are critical of the Plama and
Yukos analyses.  As Chalker explains, “[o]ne could argue that the
retrospective effect of Article 17(1) would benefit ‘long-term coop-
eration’ by encouraging investors to be upfront about ownership,
control, nationality, and citizenship.”128  The Pacific Rim tribunal’s
interpretation led to a balancing of interests between the investor
and the host state.  While the CAFTA DOB clause uses permissive
language, “may deny the benefits of this chapter,”129 and is drafted
in the present tense, the context of the DOB clause could only
properly be applied if the investor and the investment could be
analyzed retroactively, thereby denying benefits after the fact.  If
a tribunal attaches a pro-investor interpretation to the DOB
clause, it robs the provision of any real effect.  After all, the
clause’s purpose is to balance the rights of contracting states and
investors so that only the proper investors of a contracting state
receive treaty benefits.  This is evidenced in the manner tribunals
examine the DOB clauses’ conditions precedent of “substantial
business activities” and “ownership and control.”
C. “Substantial Business Activities”
As noted above, in analyzing whether a claimant had “sub-
stantial business activities” to justify the tribunal’s jurisdiction,
125. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 155.
126. Id. ¶ 159.
127. Yukos Universal Unlimited (Isle of Man) and The Russian Federation, PCA
Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 458 (Nov. 30,
2009) [hereinafter Yukos].
128. Chalker, supra note 68, at 17.
129. CAFTA, supra note 25, at art. 10.12.
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Pacific Rim applied the CAFTA DOB clause retrospectively.  Con-
versely, by analyzing “substantial business activities” in the mer-
its phase, tribunals such as Plama, AMTO, and Yukos applied the
ECT DOB clause prospectively.  The ECT tribunals, therefore,
assumed that the claimants had “substantial business activities”
to grant treaty benefits before determining whether the claimant
actually had rights to those benefits.  The question then becomes
whether, at the time of the dispute, the claimants had “substan-
tial business activities,” and not whether those activities were
adequate for the claimant to be a bona fide investor under the
treaty ab initio. Plama essentially “converted a jurisdictional
challenge into a motion to dismiss.”130  The Plama tribunal, as well
as the subsequent ECT cases, accepted the claimant’s “substantial
business activities” as true for jurisdictional purposes even though
this assumption goes directly to whether the tribunal could have
jurisdiction in the first place.  This is the wrong approach because
it does not provide a systematic analysis of all parts of the treaty
and only goes to the ordinary meaning of the language.
To the Pacific Rim tribunal, however, “the relevant question
[was] whether the claimant by itself had substantial activities in
the USA from 13 December 2007 onwards.”131  The tribunal was
measuring the business activities of the claimant, not just from
the initiation of arbitration, but from the date that the claimant
was incorporated in the United States to determine whether it
could exercise jurisdiction. Pacific Rim did not just assume that
“substantial business activities” were met; it thoroughly examined
such activities to determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  Con-
versely, the AMTO tribunal was “satisfied that the [c]laimant has
substantial business activity in Latvia, on the basis of its invest-
ment related activities conducted from the premises in Latvia,
and involving the employment of a small but permanent staff.”132
It is important to note that Pacific Rim evaluated whether the
claimant had—rather than has—“substantial business activities.”
The use of the past tense signifies that its analysis covers the
entire history of the claimant’s activities since its incorporation in
a contracting state, illustrating its jurisdictional significance.
AMTO simply looked to the present in determining whether the
claimant’s present activities rose to the level of “substantial.”
Ironically, despite using the present tense and relegating the
130. Shore, supra note 105, at 1.
131. Pac Rim Jurisdictional Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.67.
132. AMTO, supra note 111, § 69.
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DOB clause analysis to the merits phase, AMTO still looked retro-
spectively at the claimant’s business activity.  The AMTO tribunal
notes that the claimant’s office space was leased from 2000 to
2007, and that AMTO’s tax certificate showed tax payments
throughout that seven-year time frame.133  The tribunal conducted
a retroactive analysis in order to apply the DOB clause prospec-
tively but waited for the final award to engage in such interpreta-
tion.  This approach adds further confusion to DOB clause
jurisprudence.  If a tribunal is going to evaluate the past activities
and conduct of a claimant, how can this not be analyzed in light of
whether a tribunal has jurisdiction and a claimant has any rights
under the treaty?
Unlike AMTO, the Pacific Rim analysis is a reasonable appli-
cation of the VCLT treaty interpretation principles because it
takes a retrospective rather than prospective approach.  It chose
to examine not just current business activity, but also any and all
of the claimant’s business activity since it relocated in Nevada.
The Pacific Rim tribunal also decided this issue in the jurisdic-
tional phase as to not allow the tribunal to overstep its jurisdic-
tional boundaries.  This is important because Pacific Rim looked
to whether “substantial business activity” existed before delving
into the merits of the case to determine whether it should even
reach that arbitral phase.
D. “Own or Control”
Just as in defining “substantial business activities,” Pacific
Rim correctly applied VCLT Article 31 to determine whether the
claimant was “owned or controlled” by a national of a contracting
state.  Again, the tribunal looked retrospectively in determining
that the claimant “remains wholly owned by its Canadian parent
company, Pacific Rim [PRMC], a person of a non-CAFTA Party for
the purpose of CAFTA Article 10.12.2.”134 In contrast, by accepting
jurisdiction in Plama and AMTO, the tribunals implicitly accepted
that the claimant is “owned or controlled” by a national of a con-
tracting state.  Due to the fact that in both the ECT and CAFTA
the respondent must show that the claimant lacks both “substan-
tial business activities” in a contracting state and proper “owner-
ship or control” by a national of a contracting state,135 the
133. Id. § 68.
134. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.67.
135. CAFTA, supra note 25, at art. 10.12.2; ECT, supra note 15, art. 17(2).
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tribunals essentially decided that the claimant satisfied both of
the conditions needed to proceed to the merits.
The tribunals in AMTO and Plama examined current “owner-
ship or control” as the determining factor for whether the respon-
dent can deny substantive investment protection at the merits
phase.  Yet, these tribunals still must look retrospectively to make
this determination.  For example, both Plama and AMTO contain
complex shareholding structures that must be deconstructed to
discover who or what directly or indirectly “owns or controls” the
claimant.136  At the end of the analysis, both tribunals evaluate
whether the claimants were “owned or controlled” by a contracting
state at the time the DOB clause was invoked.137
Like the analysis on “substantial business activities,” both
Plama and AMTO have consistent substantive interpretations of
“ownership or control” with Pacific Rim, but such interpretation is
distorted by the prospective/retrospective distinction.  Both Plama
and AMTO looked to see whether the claimant, and only the
claimant, was “owned or controlled” by a national of a contracting
state.138  In Plama and AMTO, however, the claimant was the par-
ent company.139  The tribunals’ task, therefore, was to determine
whether the claimant was “controlled” by nationals of a con-
tracting state.  Conversely, in Pacific Rim, the claimant was a
subsidiary wholly owned by its Canadian parent company.140  This
explains why the Plama and AMTO tribunals looked to controlling
shareholders and board members.  Shares may have been held by
various subsidiaries, but in these cases, the parent company was
the claimant.  In Pacific Rim, no further analysis of the parent
company was necessary once it was established that the parent
company was not the claimant, but in fact wholly owned and con-
trolled the claimant.  Furthermore, unlike in Plama and AMTO,
the parent company in Pacific Rim was not comprised of subsidi-
aries, so it was an easier task for the Pacific Rim tribunal to iden-
tify whether the claimant belonged to a CAFTA contracting party.
While both tribunals concluded that a national of a con-
tracting state did “own or control” the claimant, this determina-
tion should be made prior to assuming jurisdiction.  If the outcome
established that the claimant was not “owned or controlled” by a
136. Plama, supra note 32, ¶¶ 83–91; AMTO, supra note 111, ¶¶ 66–67.
137. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 91; AMTO, supra note 111, ¶ 67.
138. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 83; AMTO, supra note 111, ¶ 66.
139. Plama, supra note 32, ¶ 83; AMTO, supra note 111, ¶ 66.
140. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶ 4.79.
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national of the contracting state, the tribunal would spend valua-
ble resources deciding a case that should have been terminated
before the merits were ever addressed.  Under the Plama and
AMTO merits based interpretations, “the tribunal abdicates its
responsibility to ensure that meritless claims are disposed of eco-
nomically at the jurisdictional phase.”141  Both “substantial busi-
ness activities” and “ownership or control” must be determined
during the jurisdictional phase to ensure arbitral efficiency and
economy.  If not, issues pertinent to whether the tribunal has
jurisdiction will be improperly addressed during the merits phase
of the arbitration. This will not only result in undue arbitration,
but it also will result in frivolous claims that have no cause of
action under the particular treaty used to assess the arbitral
forum.
IV. THE CAFTA DENIAL OF BENEFITS CLAUSE PROVIDES A
SOLUTION TO “TREATY SHOPPING”
Unlike the ECT cases discussed above, the Pacific Rim tribu-
nal’s treatment of the CAFTA DOB clause provides an effective
solution to “treaty shopping.”  “Treaty shopping” occurs when a
treaty is drafted or construed in such a manner that allows claim-
ants to select as the “Investor” an existing company, or even cre-
ate a new “shell” company in its investment structure, simply to
benefit from treaty provisions.142  If, like the Plama line of ECT
cases suggests, the DOB clause cannot be a jurisdictional limita-
tion on the investor’s consent, then investors will be encouraged to
reap treaty benefits without any obligations.  Tribunals will
assume at the jurisdictional phase that the claimant satisfies the
requirements of the DOB clause, thereby providing some treaty
benefits when the claimant should actually be provided no such
protection.  While investment treaties are drafted to encourage
and protect investors, these protections must be balanced with the
interests of the host state.
By regarding the CAFTA DOB clause as a jurisdictional limi-
tation to be applied retroactively, the Pacific Rim tribunal pro-
tected El Salvador from granting benefits to an entity that neither
had “substantial business activities” in a contracting state nor
was “owned or controlled” by Salvadoran nationals.143  By finding
141. Chalker, supra note 68, at 13.
142. ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 69 (2009).
143. Pac Rim Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4.63–4.82.
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that Article 17(1) was not a jurisdictional issue, the Plama tribu-
nal turns the purpose of a DOB clause on its head.  It allows host
states to be sued by investors who have no exercisable rights
under a treaty.  It also places host states in the precarious position
of regulating investors without requiring the investors to be forth-
coming about their nationalities.  The Plama tribunal, therefore,
“has created an impossible burden for regulators, especially in
those poor and transition states that are still developing regula-
tory abilities.”144
The analysis in Pacific Rim successfully prevented a “shell
company” from exercising rights and obtaining jurisdiction that it
never legitimately possessed.  Phrases such as “may refuse” and
“reserves the right to refuse,” may be permissive but do not signify
a prospective analysis.  This is because it allows a host country to
consistently assess whether particular investors have met the
burden of proof of demonstrating treaty application. A host coun-
try’s denial of treaty benefits is “left to the discretion of the host
State which chooses, according to its needs, the companies to
which it denies or accords the benefits of the treaty.”145  The denial
of benefits is not automatic.  By interpreting this language as
granting a prospective effect to the denial of benefits, Plama robs
the DOB clause of its true object and purpose: to prevent “treaty
shopping.”  After all, an investor would have little to lose if treaty
protections could not be denied to past activities that were not
legitimately made because the claimant was never eligible for
treaty protection in the first place.
By acknowledging PRMC, and not US shareholders, as the
true owner of Pac Rim, and by recognizing that any business
activities in the US was conducted under the auspice of PRMC,
the CAFTA DOB clause was given true effect.  It signifies to inves-
tors, and particularly to parent companies, that “shell companies”
cannot be created simply to provide treaty rights that the parent
company would otherwise be without.  There must be some legiti-
mate connection between an investor and the treaty benefits and
protections it seeks to utilize.  While this decision is not binding
on future CAFTA tribunals, it provides significant guidance if and
when the CAFTA DOB clause is invoked in the future.
The Pacific Rim tribunal’s treatment of the DOB clause pro-
144. Chalker, supra note 68, at 20.
145. SUZY H. NIKEMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (IISD), BEST PRACTICES
DEFINITION OF INVESTOR, 13 (2012) available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_
practices_definition_of_investor.pdf.
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vides the most effective solution to treaty shopping.  While MFN
clauses have been viewed as a solution to treaty shopping, MFN
clauses do more to encourage “treaty shopping” than to prevent it.
A MFN clause operates to “ensure that relevant parties treat each
other in a manner at least as favourable as they treat third par-
ties.”146  In other words, “MFN clauses aim at counteracting dis-
crimination between foreign investors with different
nationalities.”147  Hence, an MFN clause, unlike a DOB clause,
does not identify who qualifies as an “investor.”  Instead, an MFN
clause merely ensures that a bona fide “investor” is provided the
same treatment as compared to other “investors” under similar
BITs.  While the MFN clause may harmonize favorable treatment
among investors, it is always possible to look to alternate treaties
to find more favorable treatment for almost any substantive provi-
sion.148  According to Essing:
The investor does not have to accept the application of dis-
advantageous provisions in the third party treaty imposed
on him as a price for advantages in the course of balancing
the investor’s interests with public policy concerns of the
advantages of the third party treaty are incorporated in the
basic treaty by virtue of the MFN clause.149
The MFN clause cannot be a viable solution to “treaty shopping”
when the purpose of the MFN clause itself is to provide investors
access to more favorable treatment under treaties to which they
are not contracting parties.  Therefore, it is essential that DOB
clauses be carefully drafted and properly interpreted to prohibit
the extension of “investor” protection to unwarranted parties in
the first place.  To properly act as a safeguard against “treaty
shopping” the DOB clause analysis must be a jurisdictional analy-
sis as demonstrated in Pacific Rim.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment illustrates how Pacific Rim’s use of VCLT Arti-
cles 31 and 32 treaty interpretation principles creates an effective
CAFTA DOB clause.  Unlike the ECT, the CAFTA DOB clause
146. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 186 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
147. H. Essig, Balancing Investors’ Interests and State Sovereignty: The ICSID-
Decision on Jurisdiction Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 4:5 TDM 14
(Sept. 2007).
148. Id. at 25.
149. Id.
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provides an effective solution to “treaty shopping” and creates a
strong jurisdictional safeguard against investor abuse.  While the
Pacific Rim decision is not binding on future tribunals, it will
likely be highly influential for both CAFTA and NAFTA DOB
clause jurisprudence. Pacific Rim will also likely dissuade inves-
tors from using the United States as a safe haven for shell compa-
nies.  Companies looking to “nationality shop” for the sake of
investor protection will have to look elsewhere.
Tribunals must go beyond the ordinary meaning of a treaty
when relying on the ordinary meaning alone leads to unreasona-
ble and absurd results. Tribunals must interpret treaty provisions
in a manner that gives them effect and abides by basic principles
of statutory interpretation. Regardless of whether Pacific Rim
would have been interpreted differently had CAFTA been worded
in the same manner as the ECT, the Pacific Rim DOB analysis
adheres to all the VCLT treaty interpretation principles.  No sub-
section of VCLT Article 31 ranks superior to others. Pacific Rim’s
analysis agrees with both the ordinary meaning of the DOB
clause, and is clearly understood in the larger context of the
treaty.   While contracting parties may decide not to include a
DOB clause in a treaty, when it is included, the DOB clause
should limit the parties to those that can avail themselves of the
treaty protection in accordance with its object and purpose.  DOB
clauses must be interpreted in a way that protects both investors
and host states by providing a balanced assessment of which
investors have assumed both the obligations and benefits of the
treaty under which the investor requests arbitration.
